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FISCAL AND TAX COMPETITIVENESSThe marginal cost of public funds measures the welfare loss a society incurs in raising an
additional dollar of tax revenue. Tax increases distort economic decisions and erode tax bases
because of tax avoidance and tax evasion by taxpayers. This Commentary uses econometric
estimates of the effects of higher provincial tax rates on the provinces’ corporate income tax,
personal income tax, and sales tax bases to calculate the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) for
these taxes. 
The results indicate that the cost of increasing provincial tax revenues through a corporate tax rate
increase is very high, and in some provinces, corporate tax rate reductions in 2006 would have
increased the present value of the provincial government’s total tax revenues. The results also
suggest that significant welfare gains would accrue from reducing provincial corporate income tax
rates. As well, increasing provincial corporate and personal income tax rates can cause significant
reductions in federal tax revenues because the federal and provincial governments levy taxes on the
same tax bases. Finally, Canada’s system of the equalization grants might reduce the perceived
MCF of recipient provinces.
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N
o one likes paying taxes, but,
as Oliver Wendell Holmes
once said, they are the price
we pay to live in a civilized society.
While the tax system finances most of
the physical and social infrastructure
provided by the public sector, taxes
can erode the economic foundation
for both the public and the private
sectors. Taxes influence a wide range
of economic decisions because they
alter the prices consumers pay, and
producers receive, for the goods and
services that are produced and
consumed in a society. A tax drives a
wedge between the value of an asset
or service to society and the return
the owner or provider receives. These
tax wedges distort economic decisions,
leading to an allocation of resources
that, generally speaking, is less
productive or beneficial to society as a
whole. Collecting taxes also involves
large public administration costs and
imposes compliance costs on the
private sector. Fairness also matters:
taxes should not impose a heavy
burden on those least capable of
shouldering them.
In sum, taxes are needed to finance the public
expenditures that are essential for a prosperous
and just society, but most of all taxes need to be
good – that is, they should impose low collection
and compliance costs, cause minimal distortions
of economic decisions, and fairly distribute the
burden on taxpayers. Balancing these objectives in
choosing the overall level of taxation and the mix
of taxes is, however, a major public policy
challenge. Economists have contributed to the
formulation of tax policy by:
￿ providing theoretical frameworks and empirical
analyses of how the tax burden is shifted from
those who nominally pay the tax to those who
actually bear the burden of the tax through
changes in the prices at which they sell or purchase
goods and services;
￿ measuring the cost of administering and
complying with taxes; and
￿ analyzing the impact of taxes on the level and
growth of economic activity.
In this Commentary, we contribute to the third
aspect of tax policy analysis by measuring the
welfare losses imposed on Canadians when
provincial governments raise additional tax
revenue. We do this by measuring the marginal
cost of public funds (MCF) – a measure of the
loss incurred by a society in raising an additional
dollar of tax revenue from a particular tax source.
Thus, the focus of our analysis is on the costs that
taxes impose on society through the reallocation
of resources from more to less productive uses. It
is important to emphasize that we focus on the
marginal cost of raising tax revenue, as opposed to
the average or total cost, because most public
policy decisions are concerned with marginal –
that is, relatively small – adjustments to policies,
such as whether to reduce the personal income tax
rate by one or two percentage points, as opposed
to all-or-nothing decisions, such as whether to
eliminate the personal income tax. Even when
public decisions involve substantive changes in the
levels of taxation, the marginal cost of raising tax
revenues indicates the most beneficial directions
for pursuing tax reforms.
The marginal cost of production is a key
element in business decisions: firms cannot make
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good decisions about how to produce goods, or
what prices to charge for them, without knowing
the marginal cost of production. The marginal
cost of public funds is the public sector analogue
to the marginal cost of production for the private
sector. Governments need to produce tax
revenues, and they need to know how to raise
these revenues at the lowest possible cost.
Knowledge of the marginal cost of raising tax
revenue is also important in evaluating public
expenditure programs because the marginal
benefit of such programs needs to be balanced
against the marginal cost of financing them
through higher taxes. We hope that, one day, the
marginal cost of public funds will play the same
role in public decision-making that the marginal
cost of production plays in private sector decisions.
Although this Commentary is concerned with
the costs of taxation, we do not focus on the
compliance and administration costs of the tax
system. These costs are usually fixed, at least to
some degree, and do not increase very much if
there is a small increase in the amount of revenue
collected. Also, we do not devote a great deal of
attention to the distributional effects of taxes,
although we recognize that this is extremely
important in designing the overall tax transfer
system. Taxes that impose a heavy burden on low-
income individuals are also costly taxes from a
social perspective. The MCF concept can be used
to combine equity or distributional concerns with
efficiency effects in a summary measure of the
total cost to society of raising tax revenues.
However, in this paper we focus solely on the
efficiency effects of taxes in measuring the MCF
of the corporate income tax, personal income tax,
and sales taxes.
We begin by explaining what the marginal cost
of funds means and how it can be used to evaluate
tax policies and public expenditure programs. We
show how the concept of the marginal cost of
public funds is related to the slope, or curvature,
of a government’s Laffer curve – a curve that
shows the amount of tax revenues that can be
collected at different tax rates. We stress the effects
of a tax change on all sources of tax revenues, as
well as the effects on future tax revenues, in
measuring the MCF. 
We then present estimates of the marginal 
cost of public funds for provincial governments
for corporate income tax, personal income tax,
and provincial sales tax. We focus on the provinces
because they, and local governments, are the big
spenders, accounting for around 60 percent of
program spending by all levels of government. In
addition, the variation in tax rates across provinces
and over time provides an ideal laboratory in
which to estimate the tax sensitivities of tax 
bases – the parameters at the heart of our 
MCF calculations.
Our estimates are based on an econometric
study of the tax sensitivity of provincial tax bases
(Dahlby and Ferede 2011), which is available as a
working paper on the C.D. Howe website. In that
study, we show that higher provincial corporate
income tax rates erode provincial corporate tax
bases by deterring investment and encouraging
tax-planning measures. Since provincial corporate
income tax bases are highly mobile, both
interprovincially and internationally, they are
highly sensitive to tax, and thus the MCF for
provincial corporate income taxes is very high.
The MCF for provincial personal income taxes is
lower than that for provincial corporate income
taxes, however, in all provinces except Quebec,
while the lowest MCF is that for provincial 
sales taxes. 
In the penultimate section, we discuss some of
the policy implications that flow from our
computations of the MCF for both the federal
and provincial governments. Our results indicate
that the cost of raising additional tax revenue
through corporate and personal income tax
increases is high, and that significant welfare gains
would flow from reducing provincial corporate
income taxes along with a revenue-neutral switch
to higher provincial sales taxes in Alberta, British
Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, and
Quebec. In the other five provinces, a cut in the
corporate income tax rate in 2006 would have
increased the present values of their total tax
revenues and, therefore, would not have required
an offsetting increase in provincial sales taxes. Commentary 324 | 3
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Another implication of our results is that
governments should use expenditure restraint to
rebalance their budgets because it is likely that
some expenditure programs cannot generate
benefits at the margin that would cover the marginal
cost of financing them. Our results strongly
endorse the cuts to the federal corporate income
tax rate that have taken place over the past eight
years and that are scheduled for 2011 and 2012.
Another reason provincial governments should
not try to solve their fiscal problems by increasing
personal and corporate income tax rates is that
doing so would erode these bases, which the
provinces share with the federal government. Our
results indicate that an increase in the provincial
corporate income tax rate that would raise an
additional dollar of tax revenue for the province
would lower the present value of federal tax
revenue by an amount that ranges from $0.78 in
Manitoba to $2.09 in Quebec, while an additional
dollar of provincial personal income tax revenue
would reduce federal revenue by $0.75 in Quebec
and $0.89 in the other provinces. Our computations
also indicate that the equalization grant formula
might reduce drastically the perceived MCF of
provinces that receive these grants. Reducing the
size of the fiscal gap the equalization program fills
or tying the formula used to calculate the grants
less closely to provincial tax bases would reduce
the potential bias in the recipient provinces’
perceived MCF.
In the final section, we summarize our main results.
The Concept of the Marginal Cost of
Public Funds 
Taxes influence economic decisions. Generally
speaking, more tax revenue can be obtained from
a tax base only by giving up some of the private
sector activity that generates that tax base. For
example, personal income taxes reduce income-
generating activity because they create disincentives
to work, save, and invest. Increasing a provincial
retail sales tax will reduce retail activity in a
province by increasing the incentive to engage in
cross-border shopping. The efficiency loss from
the reallocation of resources caused by tax increases
is reflected in the shrinkage of the tax base.
Of course, taxes can help to improve the
allocation of resources by reducing activities that
generate harmful externalities – that is, where the
private cost to an individual or firm of engaging in
an activity is less than its full social cost because
part of the cost is borne by a third party. While
economists generally support the use of taxes to
control the effects of harmful externalities, here we
are concerned with three broad taxes – corporate
income taxes, personal income taxes, and
provincial sales taxes – whose primary function 
is to raise revenue and which play only a minor
role in offsetting externalities because they do 
not focus on a narrow range of externality-
producing activities.
When the tax rate increases, it shrinks the tax
base by encouraging tax avoidance or tax evasion –
the percentage increase in tax revenue then is less
than the percentage increase in the tax rate. For
example, if a government raises a tax rate by 10
percent and the private sector responds by
reducing the amount of the taxed activity by 2
percent, the government’s tax revenue will increase
by 8 percent, not 10 percent. The efficiency loss
from the reallocation of resources in the economy
due to a tax is reflected in this shrinkage of the tax
base. To illustrate how this phenomenon affects
the calculation of the marginal cost of public
funds, because the 10 percent tax rate increase
generates only an 8 percent increase in tax
revenue, the cost of raising that last, or marginal,
dollar of tax revenue is 10/8, or 1.25. In other
words, at the existing tax rate, raising an additional
dollar of tax revenue costs society $1.25.
1
The notion that taxes create a deadweight loss
or excess burden has been one of economists’
1 This is only an approximation of the MCF, since a 10 percent tax rate increase is not a marginal increase. But using a 10 percent change,
instead of an infinitesimal increase, allows us to illustrate the concept using simple arithmetic. For a more rigorous treatment of the
foundation of the MCF, see Dahlby (2008, chap. 2).| 4 Commentary 324
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insights since at least the time of Adam Smith,
who, in the Wealth of Nations, described the
deleterious effects of a window tax that was levied
in his time. Homeowners boarded up windows in
their houses or built new houses with fewer
windows to reduce the amount of tax they would
have to pay, which impaired living conditions. In
this way, the burden of the window tax exceeded
the tax revenue collected by the government. The
MCF concept builds on Smith’s insight and is a
way of quantifying the additional excess burden
imposed on the economic system as additional tax
revenue is raised.
If the size of the tax base were not affected by
the tax rate, then a 10 percent increase in the tax
rate would increase tax revenue by 10 percent, and
the MCF would be 1.00 – that is, the cost to
society of raising an additional dollar of tax
revenue is $1.00. As previously noted, however, in
almost all cases we expect the tax base to shrink
when the tax rate increases and, therefore, the
MCF usually is greater than 1.00. It is even
possible for the MCF of a tax to be less than 1.00
if it reduces the production and consumption of
products with harmful externalities, or if a tax rate
increase on one base causes other tax bases to
expand as taxpayers shift their activities to the
lower-taxed bases. Indeed, the MCF for the
corporate income tax in Quebec has been less
than 1.00 because higher corporate income tax
rates have led to a larger personal income tax base.
(We discuss the interaction between tax bases and
the implications for the MCF in more detail below.)
There is a direct connection between the MCF
and the slope of the so-called Laffer curve – the
curve that shows the amount of tax revenue that
can be raised at various tax rates.
2 Usually, the
Laffer curve is portrayed as having an inverted U
shape, implying that it has both upward and
downward sloping sections (see Figure 1). If the
tax base is highly tax sensitive, perhaps because it
is easy to switch to non-taxed activities or
commodities, or if the tax rate is very high, then a
tax rate increase might lead to a reduction in total
tax revenue. Conversely, a tax rate reduction
might lead to an increase in tax revenue. For
example, if a government is at point D, on the
downward-sloping section of the Laffer curve in
Figure 1, and it increases its tax rate by 10
percent, the tax base will shrink by more than 10
percent, causing total tax revenue to decline.
Conversely, a small tax rate reduction at the same
point will cause the base to increase by a larger
percentage, leading to an increase in total tax
revenue. Thus, on the downward-sloping section
of the Laffer curve, a tax rate reduction will
improve social welfare because taxpayers will
benefit from the lower tax rate and the government
will have more revenue with which to provide
more public services or be able to cut other taxes.
At the same time, the MCF of a government on
the downward-sloping section of the Laffer curve
is not well defined since the government can raise
more revenue through a tax rate reduction.
If, however, the government is near, but not at,
point C – the top of the Laffer curve – and it
increases the tax rate by a small amount, it will
impose an additional burden on taxpayers while
raising very little additional tax revenue. Some
taxpayer pain with virtually no revenue gain
implies that the cost of an additional dollar of tax
revenue is very high – indeed, infinite if the
government is at point C on the curve. Since the
marginal benefit to society from additional tax
revenue is rarely, if ever, infinite, a government
should operate on the upward-sloping section of
the Laffer curve, such as at points A or B. Generally
speaking, we expect the MCF to increase as the
tax rate increases because, as Figure 1 illustrates, a
given tax rate increase generates smaller increments
in tax revenue at higher tax rates. This is reflected
in the declining slopes of the tangents to the
2 The notion that a higher tax rate can lead to lower tax revenue is often attributed to the US economist Arthur Laffer – and thus the
relationship is popularly known as the Laffer curve – although the phenomenon was noted as early as 1776 by Adam Smith in The 
Wealth of Nations, by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers, by the French economist-engineer Jules Dupuit in 1844, and by 




3. The key point is that raising more tax
revenue through tax rate increases usually comes
at an increasing marginal cost. Figure 2 therefore
shows the MCF curve that corresponds to the
stylized Laffer curve in Figure 1.
Importantly, governments can use the MCF
concept to help make tax policy and expenditure
decisions. With regard to tax policy, the basic idea
is that governments should try to raise revenue
from the least costly sources of tax revenue.
3 If the
MCF of one source of tax revenue (say, personal
income tax) is higher than that of another source
of tax revenue (such as sales tax), then there is a
potential efficiency gain from a revenue-neutral
tax reform that lowers the personal income tax
rate and raises the sales tax rate. For example, if
the MCF of personal income tax is 1.50 and the
Commentary 324 | 5

















Figure 1: The Laffer Curve






























Figure 2: The MCF Curve
3 They should bear in mind, however, that different taxes have different compliance and administration costs that might fall on different
segments of the population.| 6 Commentary 324
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MCF for provincial sales tax is 1.25, then shifting
a dollar of tax revenue from the former to the
latter will result in a net gain for society of 0.25.
Of course, the change in the distribution of the
tax burden should be taken into account in
assessing the overall impact of the tax reform, but
a large differential in the MCF of various taxes
indicates that potentially large efficiency gains are
to be had from tax reform, which would justify
measures to ameliorate any undesirable changes in
the distribution of the tax burden, such as
refundable tax credits for low-income individuals.
With regard to expenditure decisions, the fact
that additional spending sooner or later must be
funded by additional tax revenue implies that the
marginal benefit from an additional dollar spent
on a public program should be greater than or
equal to the MCF for the taxes that will be used
to finance it. To illustrate, suppose that spending
an additional dollar on a transportation project
generates $1.15 in direct benefits to individuals
because the project shortens their commuting
time. In that event, additional spending on the
transportation project would be worthwhile if the
MCF is equal to 1.00. Suppose, however, that the
government must finance the spending with an
increase in personal income tax, and the MCF for
the tax is 1.50. The cost of raising an additional
dollar of tax revenue is thus $1.50, which exceeds
the additional direct benefit to taxpayers from the
expenditure ($1.15), so that additional spending
on the transportation project would not be
warranted on a cost-benefit basis. In short, the
marginal benefit from public spending has to
exceed the MCF for the tax that is used to finance
the spending if expanding the program is to be
justified on a cost-benefit basis. If the MCF
exceeds the marginal benefit from the spending
program, then the expenditure program should be
cut until the marginal benefit from the last dollar
spent on the program is at least as large as the
MCF. Another way of saying this is that the
threshold marginal benefit for public expenditure
programs will be higher the higher is the
government’s MCF.
4
The preceding example also illustrates how
governments should evaluate productivity-
enhancing public expenditures. Suppose the
transportation project not only reduces commuting
time, with a marginal benefit of $1.15 for each
additional dollar spent on the project; it also
allows firms to ship more products to an export
market at a lower cost. This increase in economic
activity would generate additional income, which,
in turn, would generate additional tax revenue for
the government. Suppose the project generates
$0.25 in after-tax income and $0.10 in additional
tax revenue for each additional dollar spent on the
project on top of the $1.15 in direct benefits from
reduced commuting time. For the purposes of
cost-benefit analysis, each additional dollar of tax
revenue should be valued at the MCF because it
can reduce or displace the need to raise additional
costly tax revenue. In this example, the total
marginal benefit from an additional dollar spent
on the project is 1.15 + 0.25 + (1.50)(0.10) = 1.55,
and additional spending on the transportation
project would be worthwhile because the total
marginal benefit, 1.55, exceeds the MCF, 1.50.
While a tax’s MCF is directly related to the tax
sensitivity of its tax base, tax bases are often
interrelated, in the sense that an increase in the tax
rate on one base can either increase or reduce
other tax bases. For example, the personal income
tax rate might affect individuals’ decisions about
whether or not to incorporate their businesses. If
the rate increases, more individuals might find it
advantageous to incorporate their businesses to
shelter or delay their business income from the
personal income tax. Thus, a personal income tax
rate increase might increase the size of the
corporate income tax base and shift some of the
4 See Dahlby (2009) for an example of how the MCF can be used in cost-benefit analysis and how it raises the threshold return that programs
or policies have to meet.Commentary 324 | 7
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government’s tax revenues from the personal
income tax to the corporate income tax. If a tax
rate increase causes taxpayers to shift their
activities in ways that expand the government’s
other tax bases, then the MCF for that tax will be
lower than it otherwise would be because of the
additional tax revenue that it generates from the
expansion of the other tax bases. In other cases, a
higher tax rate on one base will erode other tax
bases. For example, a personal income tax increase
might reduce the incentive to work, causing a
reduction in hours worked and income earned.
Consumption spending will decline, leading to
lower sales tax revenue. When a tax rate increase
erodes other tax bases, as well as causing its own
base to shrink, then the MCF will be
correspondingly higher because of the reductions
in tax revenue from other tax bases. The key point
in evaluating the effect of any tax rate increase,
and measuring the MCF for a tax, is that we need
to assess its impact on total tax revenue, not just
on the revenue generated from that tax source.
Another important point to stress is that it
almost always takes several years for a tax base to
adjust fully to a change in the tax rate. This is
particularly true for the corporate income tax, as
businesses gradually adjust their levels of
investment and, in some cases, their production
locations in response to a tax rate change. Thus,
the short-run decline in a tax base in response to a
tax rate increase might be considerably smaller
than the long-run decline that occurs after
individuals and firms have had time to adjust fully
their consumption and business plans. For this
reason, in calculating the MCF we focus on the
effects of a tax rate increase on the present value of
the stream of total tax revenue it will generate,
rather than on the current or short-term effects,
because a government’s effective budget constraint
is its intertemporal one, which requires that an
additional dollar of program spending be financed
by an additional dollar of tax revenue, both
measured in present value terms.
The Provincial Governments’ MCF 
In this section, we list some of our key
assumptions in calculating the MCF of the
provincial governments – for a brief description of
how we calculated the MCF, see the Appendix.
Specifically, we assumed that:
￿ changes in the rates of corporate income tax,
personal income tax, and provincial sales tax 
do not affect property tax revenues and other 
tax revenues;
￿ the burden of the corporate income tax, personal
income tax, and provincial sales tax is borne by
residents of the province – that is, there is no
interprovincial or international shifting of these
tax burdens;
￿ the interactions between the tax bases of the
provincial and federal governments are not
incorporated; and
￿ the non-tax distortions in the economy, such as
the rate of involuntary unemployment, are not
affected by increases in these taxes.
Table 1 shows our calculations of the provincial
governments’ MCF for the three tax bases in
2006. In line with expectations concerning the tax
sensitivity of provincial business tax bases, the
MCF for corporate income tax is very high. We
did not compute the MCF for corporate income
tax for Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward
Island, or Saskatchewan because these four
provinces are on the downward-sloping section of
the Laffer curve with respect to their corporate
income tax rates. In these provinces, a reduction
in the corporate income tax rate would increase
the present value of the provincial government’s
total tax revenue, and a reduction in the corporate
income tax in 2006 would have had a welfare-
improving effect. For the other provinces, the
MCF for the corporate income tax ranges from
40.83 in Alberta to 2.25 in Manitoba.
In Quebec, the MCF for the personal income
tax exceeds that for the corporate income tax (for
reasons we discuss below), while in Manitoba the
MCF for these two taxes is about the same. In
four other provinces – Alberta, British Columbia,
New Brunswick, and Newfoundland and
Labrador – the MCF for the corporate income tax
exceeds that for the personal income tax.| 8 Commentary 324
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As well, the MCF for the corporate income tax
varies widely from year to year, as Figure 3 shows
for British Columbia. Here, we did not compute
the MCF for the period from 1972 to 1981
because a reduction in the tax rate would have
increased the present value of the province’s total
tax revenue. This was also the situation in 1984,
1994 to 1998, 2001, and 2004. In the other years
in which the MCF for the corporate income tax
had positive values, it ranged from 0.96 in 1982
to 184.39 in 2000. The reason for these wide
fluctuations is the large year-to-year changes in
corporate income tax’s share of total tax revenue in
British Columbia – in other words, random
fluctuations in the size of the corporate income
tax base produced large year-to-year variations in
our computed MCF. Using a five-year moving
average for the tax shares reduces the variations in
the MCF somewhat, but year-to-year variations
are still quite large: 12.22 in 2002, 8.87 in 2003,
7.48 in 2004, 6.14 in 2005, and 8.70 in 2006.
Nevertheless, the main point is clear: the cost of
increasing provincial tax revenue through a
corporate tax rate increase is very high, and in
some provinces a corporate tax rate reduction
would increase the present value of the
government’s total tax revenue.
As for personal income tax, the MCF in 2006
ranged from 1.45 in Alberta to 3.85 in Quebec,
and were generally higher in the Atlantic
provinces than in the three western provinces; for
Ontario, the MCF was 2.16. Figure 4 shows how
the MCF for the personal income tax has varied in
Ontario since 1972. During the mid-1990s it
exceeded 2.50; in 1994 and 1995 it exceeded
3.00. These calculations indicate that, even in
Canada’s largest province and industrial heartland,
the cost of raising additional revenue through the
personal income tax has been relatively high.
The lowest MCF was that for provincial sales
tax, ranging from 1.00 in Alberta to 1.21 in
Prince Edward Island. Alberta’s MCF was low, of
course, because that province does not levy a
general sales tax. In addition, our results show that
an increase in provincial sales tax does not have a
significant effect on other provincial tax bases,
Table 1: The Marginal Cost of Public Funds for Corporate Income Tax, Personal Income Tax, 
and General Sales Tax, Provincial and Federal Governments, 2006 
* The MCF is undefined because a small reduction in the corporate income tax rate would increase the present value of the government’s total
tax revenue, resulting in a social welfare gain.
Corporate Income Tax Personal Income Tax General Sales Tax
marginal cost of public funds ($)
British Columbia 11.64 1.83 1.13
Alberta 40.83 1.45 1.00
Saskatchewan * 1.86 1.13
Manitoba 2.25 2.16 1.13
Ontario * 2.16 1.15
Quebec 2.57 3.85 1.15
New Brunswick 4.30 2.22 1.15
Nova Scotia * 2.46 1.15
Prince Edward Island * 2.31 1.21
Newfoundland & Labrador 30.31 2.54 1.15
Federal Government 1.71 1.17 1.11Commentary 324 | 9












19821 9 841 9 861 9 88 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Figure 3: The MCF for the Corporate Income Tax, British Columbia, 1982-2006
Source: Authors’ calculations.

















Figure 4: The MCF for the Personal Income Tax, Ontario, 1972-2006
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implying that, in Alberta, the MCF from
introducing a small sales tax would be 1.00, much
lower than the MCF for either the corporate or
personal income tax in that province.
5
Figure 5 shows the MCF for both the corporate
income tax and personal income tax for Quebec
over a 35-year period. From 1978 to 1983,
however, we could not compute the MCF for the
personal income tax because a reduction the
personal income tax rate would have increased the
present value of total tax revenue. Note also that
the MCF for the corporate income tax was less
than 1.00 in the mid-1980s because our econometric
model indicates that an increase in the corporate
income tax rate would have increased the personal
income tax base, resulting in a significant increase
in revenue from personal income tax, given
Quebec’s high personal income tax rates.
6
Subsequent adjustments in the rates of both
corporate and personal income tax, however, have
narrowed the gap between the two taxes’ MCF.
Although we have focused on the provinces,
some of our regression results also can be used to
compute the federal government’s MCF for the
corporate income, personal income, and sales
taxes. Ottawa’s MCF is, of course, important in
itself for the purposes of tax policy and expenditure
evaluation, but comparing it with that of
provincial governments also provides a measure of
the vertical fiscal imbalance in the federation. Our
estimates of the federal government’s MCF for the
corporate and personal income taxes, shown in
the last row in Table 1, are 1.71 and 1.17,
respectively – substantially lower than that for any
province, since the corporate and personal income
tax bases are much more sensitive to provincial
than to federal taxes.
7 Our estimate of the MCF
for a federal sales tax, at 1.11, is similar to the
provincial governments’ MCF because we
assumed the tax bases sensitivities to be the same
and the only differences in the computations of
the federal and provincial sales tax MCF are due
to variations in their tax shares. Since, in recent
years, the federal government has cut corporate
income, personal income, and sales tax rates, it is
useful to consider Ottawa’s overall MCF as a
weighted average of these three taxes, with weights
based on their relative shares of federal tax
revenue. The resulting weighted average MCF for
the federal government was 1.26 in 2006.
8
5 Our econometric analysis (Dahlby and Ferede 2011) does not indicate that the corporate and personal income tax bases are less sensitive to
sales tax increases in provinces with a harmonized sales tax than in provinces that levy a retail sales tax, where business inputs are included in
the tax base. Therefore, our MCF calculations for sales taxes are the same for both harmonized and retail sales taxes, even though previous
studies (such as Smart and Bird 2009; and Dahlby and Ferede 2009) have found that retail sales taxes have a negative effect on business
investment and economic growth. In view of the latter results, we continue to endorse the policy of switching from a retail sales tax to a
harmonized sales tax.
6 Although Quebec levies a high marginal tax on its residents’ incomes, the federal personal income tax rate is reduced by 16.5 percent because
of the Quebec abatement, an arrangement whereby Quebec receives a lower federal transfer in exchange for increased tax room. However, the
lower federal personal income tax rate does not reduce Quebec’s MCF from an increase in the personal income tax rate because it is the
provincial tax rate, not the combined federal and provincial marginal tax rate, that determines the province’s MCF. On the other hand, an
increase in Quebec’s personal income tax rate has a lower effect on federal revenue than does an increase in any other province because of the
Quebec abatement.
7 It should be noted that our measure of the tax sensitivity of the federal personal income tax base is not as precisely estimated as the tax
sensitivities of the federal corporate income tax base or the provincial corporate and personal income tax bases; therefore, one should place a
large “confidence interval” around it.
8 It is interesting to compare our regression-based results for the federal government’s MCF with those obtained by Baylor and Beauséjour
(2004) using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model. If we convert their marginal distortionary loss calculations into estimates of
the MCF, they obtain an MCF of 1.40 for the corporate income tax, 1.30 for the personal income tax, and 1.10 for a consumption tax. Our
estimates of the MCF for the corporate income tax are somewhat higher than theirs, but, as we noted above, our estimates vary considerably
from year to year because of fluctuations in the business tax base. Our results for the MCF for the personal income tax are somewhat lower
than either those by Baylor and Beauséjour or computations from the early 1990s by Dahlby (1994). Finally, our estimates for the sales tax
are very similar to the results of Baylor and Beauséjour for a consumption tax. They also compute a weighted average MCF of 1.30, which is
remarkably close to our weighted average of 1.26 and the same as Dahlby (2009) computes for Canada using a dynamic growth model with
public sector debt. While there are differences in the estimates of the MCF, our estimates are based on a regression model of the tax
sensitivities of the three tax bases, while earlier results are based on simulation models using “best guess” estimates of the key parameters that
affect tax sensitivities.Commentary 324 | 11
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Figure 5: The MCF for the Corporate Income Tax and  Personal Income Tax, Quebec, 1972-2006
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Policy Implications 
In broad terms, we find that provincial corporate
income tax has the highest MCF and sales tax the
lowest, which is consistent with research on the
distortionary effects of taxes in Arnold (2008) and
Johansson et al. (2008). Further, there would have
been significant welfare gains in 2006 from
reductions in provincial corporate income tax
rates, with a revenue-neutral switch to higher
provincial sales taxes, in Alberta, British
Columbia, Manitoba, Quebec, and New
Brunswick. In the other five provinces, a cut in
the corporate income tax rate would have
increased the current value of total tax revenue
and, therefore, would not have required an
offsetting increase in provincial sales tax.
This endorsement of a greater emphasis on sales
taxes is consistent with advice many economists
have given over the years, but governments usually
have firmly resisted this policy option because of
the perceived regressivity of sales tax. Indeed, the
adverse distributional effects of sales tax are a
concern, and provinces need to take measures to
protect vulnerable groups, such as low-income
seniors, if they choose to rely more on such a tax.
Nonetheless, data on annual total consumption
spending by income level – typically used in tax-
incidence studies – overstate sales tax regressivity,
since ratios of consumption to income vary less by
income when longer periods are used to measure
the incidence of the sales tax. That said, the
potential gains from a greater emphasis on sales
tax revenue are so large that provincial government
officials and the public should carefully consider
this option. If it should prove politically infeasible,
however, then another option, which would yield
welfare improvements in every province except
Quebec,
9 is to reduce corporate income tax rates
with offsetting revenue-neutral increases in personal
income tax rates. Since our econometric model
indicates that an increase in the corporate income
tax rate increases the personal income tax base,
such a move would help to reduce the MCF for
the corporate income tax, especially in Quebec,
where the personal income tax rate is high.
9 The situation in Quebec is anomalous because of that province’s high personal income tax rates combined (until recently) with relatively low
corporate income tax rates.| 12 Commentary 324
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Over the next few years, the federal and
provincial governments will have to exercise fiscal
restraint to eliminate deficits. Since our results
indicate that the cost of raising additional tax
revenue through corporate and personal income
tax increases is high, governments accordingly
should look first at expenditure cuts or, at least,
expenditure freezes to rebalance their budgets
because it is likely that there are programs that
cannot generate benefits at the margin that exceed
the marginal cost of financing them. (Borrowed
dollars have to be financed by future tax increases
that have a high MCF.) In particular, our results
strongly endorse the cuts to the federal corporate
tax rates that have taken place over the past eight
years and scheduled for 2011 and 2012. They also
mean that the provinces should not try to restore
fiscal balance by increasing provincial corporate
tax rates.
Vertical Tax Externalities 
Another reason provincial governments should
not try to solve their fiscal problems by increasing
tax rates is that doing so would erode the tax bases
that the provinces share with the federal government.
Indeed, all the major tax bases – personal income,
corporate income, and sales and excise taxes – are
taxed by both levels of government. When two
levels of government levy taxes on the same or
similar tax bases, an increase in the tax rate
imposed by one level normally (but not always)
will reduce the revenue the other level can collect
at its existing tax rate because the tax base shrinks
when the combined tax rate increases. Our results
indicate that an increase in the provincial
corporate income tax rate that would raise an
additional dollar of tax revenue for a provincial
government would lower the current value of
federal tax revenue by an amount that ranges from
$0.78 in Manitoba to $2.09 in Quebec,
10 while an
additional dollar of provincial personal income tax
revenue would reduce the present value of federal
revenue by $0.75 in Quebec and by $0.89 in the
other provinces. Further, the vertical tax externality
is relatively minor for provincial sales taxes: an
additional dollar of provincial sales tax revenue
would reduce federal revenue by only $0.10.
Thus, if provinces tried to resolve their fiscal
problems through corporate or personal income
tax increases, they would only exacerbate the
federal government’s fiscal situation. Canadians
taxpayers would not benefit if their provincial
governments simply passed the fiscal hot potato
to Ottawa.
If the provinces ought not to raise income taxes
to solve their fiscal problems and if expenditure
restrain is difficult in view of the inexorable
spending increases on health care, should higher
federal transfers to the provinces be part of the
fiscal adjustment policy? Our results provide
qualified support for maintaining, if not
increasing, cash transfers to provinces under the
Canada Health Transfer and Canada Social
Transfer programs, which are to be renewed in
2014, since the federal government’s MCF is
lower than those of the provincial governments. In
that sense, it would be better for Ottawa to raise
taxes, or forgo program spending, than for the
provinces to raise corporate or personal income
taxes if they are unable to accomplish fiscal
adjustment solely through expenditure restraint.
Renegotiating these cash transfers, however, would
involve a number of other important issues, such
as whether or not the transfers should increase
automatically each year, which might create a bias
toward higher provincial expenditures, including
higher negotiated wage settlements. Finally, the
lowest-cost way to finance rising healthcare costs
would be to increase sales taxes. Though
unpopular, such a move would force the provinces
10 When a province increases corporate and personal income tax rates, it shrinks these tax bases, thus lowering the amount of revenue the
federal government can collect at constant rates. Furthermore, our econometric results do not indicate that there is any offsetting increase in
federal tax revenues from increases in the tax bases of other provinces when a given province increases its tax rate. The effect on federal tax
revenue of an increase in the provincial corporate income tax rate varies considerably across provinces because the total effect includes the
effect on federal personal income tax revenue as well as the effect on federal corporate income tax revenue, and there are large variations in
the relative sizes of the corporate and personal income tax bases among the provinces.Commentary 324 | 13
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to undertake much needed reforms of their
healthcare systems. 
Fiscal Equalization 
What about expanding transfers under the
equalization program to reduce fiscal pressures on
recipient provinces? One major concern with
making the equalization program more generous
is that it might reduce the provinces’ perceived
MCF, because equalization compensates provinces
through higher transfers if their tax bases decline
as a result of a tax rate increase. As Smart puts it,
“the [equalization] grants in effect subsidize
increases in distortionary taxes by equalization-
receiving governments” (2007, 1208). He finds
that, when deficiencies in fiscal capacity that are
equalized increase from 50 percent to 100 percent,
the recipient provinces’ average effective tax rates
increase by about seven percentage points.
If we modify the computations of the MCF to
account for the increase in equalization payments
a province receives if it raises its tax rate and its tax
base then declines, we find that the MCF for both
corporate and personal income tax declines greatly
(see Table 2). Three provinces – Nova Scotia,
Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan – that
were on the negatively sloped sections of the
Laffer curve for the corporate income tax rate,
according to our calculations presented in Table 1,
now would be on the upward-sloping section of
the curve, and their MCFs would range from 1.44
for Saskatchewan to 1.69 for Prince Edward
Island. Note also that the MCF for the corporate
income tax in Quebec now would be less than 1.0.
Similar, though less dramatic, reductions would
occur in the MCF for personal income tax for the
equalization-receiving provinces. In short,
equalization transfers create a significant downward
bias in the perceived MCF of recipient provinces.
Is inducing higher tax rates by equalization-
receiving provinces a good thing? Models
developed by Köthenbürger (2002) and Bucovetsky
and Smart (2006) show that, by inducing higher
rates of taxation, an equalization grant formula
can offset the downward pressure on tax rates
caused by interprovincial tax competition for
mobile tax bases.  Smart concludes, however, that
the effects of tax competition within the 
federation on tax rates are negligible, so that
equalization grants cannot be interpreted as
(however unintentional) a corrective device for tax
competition, and the tax-raising effect of the grants
is deleterious to consumer welfare (2007, 1,210),
a conclusion that is consistent with our own
finding of little evidence that tax rates in other
Table 2: The Perceived Marginal Cost of Public Funds for Corporate Income Tax, Personal Income Tax,
and General Sales Tax, Provinces Receiving Equalization Payments, 2006 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Corporate Income Tax Personal Income Tax Provincial Sales Tax
marginal cost of public funds ($)
British Columbia 1.17 0.99 1.02
Saskatchewan 1.44 0.94 1.01
Manitoba 1.27 1.01 1.01
Quebec 0.83 1.44 1.04
New Brunswick 0.95 1.01 1.02
Nova Scotia 1.59 1.06 1.02
Prince Edward Island 1.69 1.03 1.07
Newfoundland & Labrador 1.14 1.07 1.02| 14 Commentary 324
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provinces affect a given province’s tax base
(Dahlby and Ferede 2011). Consequently, we
conclude that, to the extent that recipient
provinces’ tax policies are affected by the
equalization grant formula, they underestimate
the marginal cost of raising provincial tax revenue.
When we compare the actual MCF in Table 1
with the perceived MCF in Table 2 and add
Smart’s empirical results on the effects of the
equalization formula on provincial tax rates, we
conclude that making the equalization formula
more generous might simply lead to higher
provincial tax rates, which would come at a high
social cost. Reducing the size of the fiscal gap that
is filled through the equalization program would
reduce the potential bias in the recipient
provinces’ perceived MCF.
Conclusions 
The marginal cost of public funds is an important
concept that should be used in evaluating
governments’ tax policies and expenditure
programs. We estimate that, in 2006, the marginal
cost of public funds for corporate income tax was
very high in six provinces, ranging from 40.83 in
Alberta to 2.25 in Manitoba. We did not compute
the MCF for Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince
Edward Island, and Saskatchewan, however,
because a reduction in the corporate income tax
rate in these provinces would have increased the
present value of their government’s total tax
revenue, and a reduction in the corporate income
tax in 2006 would have had a welfare-improving
effect. For personal income tax, the MCF in 2006
ranged from 1.45 in Alberta to 3.85 in Quebec;
only in Quebec was the MCF for corporate
income tax lower than that for personal income
tax. The lowest MCF was that for provincial sales
tax, ranging from 1.00 in Alberta to 1.21 in
Prince Edward Island.
Although we focused on the provinces’ MCF,
we also calculated the marginal cost of public
funds when the federal government raises its tax
rate. The federal government’s MCF for the
corporate and personal income tax in 2006 was
1.71 and 1.17, respectively, which was
substantially lower than that for any province,
while the MCF for an increase in the goods and
services tax, at 1.11, was similar to the provincial
governments’ MCF for an increase in the general
sales tax. The weighted average MCF for the
federal government was 1.26. 
Our results indicate that the cost of raising
additional tax revenue through corporate and
personal income tax increases is high, and that
there would be significant welfare gains from
reducing provincial corporate income taxes, with a
revenue-neutral switch to higher provincial sales
taxes in Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba,
New Brunswick, and Quebec. In the other five
provinces, a cut in the corporate income tax rate
would have increased the present value of total tax
revenue and, therefore, would not have required
an offsetting provincial sales tax increase.
Another implication of our results is that
governments should use expenditure restraint,
rather than increases in corporate and personal
income tax rates, to solve their fiscal problems,
not only because it is likely that some expenditure
programs are unable to generate benefits at the
margin that would cover the marginal cost of
financing them, but also because increasing tax
rates would erode the tax bases that the province
share with the federal government.
Our results also strongly endorse the cuts to the
federal corporate income tax rate that have taken
place over the past eight years and that are
scheduled for 2011 and 2012. We find that an
increase in the provincial corporate income tax
rate that would raise an additional dollar of
provincial tax revenue would lower the present
value of federal tax revenue by an amount that
ranges from $0.78 in Manitoba to $2.09 in
Quebec. Similarly, an additional dollar of
provincial personal income tax revenue would
reduce federal revenue by $0.75 in Quebec and 
by $0.89 in the other provinces.
Finally, equalization transfers might reduce
significantly the perceived MCF for the provinces
that receive these grants. Reducing the size of the
fiscal gap that is filled through the equalization
program would reduce the potential bias in the
recipient provinces’ perceived MCF.Commentary 324 | 15
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11 The percentage reduction in the tax base increases over time as taxpayers find ways to adjust to a tax rate increase. Because the government’s
intertemporal budget constraint depends on the present value of its tax revenue and expenditure, the Hii parameter reflects the present value
of the reduction in the tax base, which is between the short-term, and ultimate long-term, percentage change in the tax base. 
Appendix: Calculation of the MCF
Based on Estimates of the Sensitivity
of Tax Bases to Tax Rate Changes
For a detailed description of how we compute the
MCF, see Dahlby and Ferede (2011). Here, we
provide a brief summary. For a given province in a
given year, the marginal cost of public funds for
tax base i is computed according to the formula
where si is tax base i’s share of total tax revenue for
the province,  i is the tax rate imposed on tax base
i, and Hji is is the present -value weighted average
of the change in tax base j with respect to a one
percentage point increase in the tax rate on tax
base i.
11 Hji reflects the own-tax base change when
its tax rate increases, and Hji (with j not equal to i)
measures the interdependence of the tax bases –
specifically, the effect of an increase in tax rate i on
tax base j.
The key behavioural components of the MCF
are the Hji parameters, which we estimate using
regression equations based on annual panel data
for the 10 Canadian provinces for the period
1972-2006 for the corporate income tax, the
personal income tax, and the sales tax. We find
that the effect of a tax increase on its own base,
the Hii, was negative and statistically significant
for all three taxes. A one percentage point increase
in corporate income, personal income, and sales
tax rates was associated with 2.3, 0.76, and 0.63
percent reductions, respectively, in their tax bases
in the short run. The corresponding long-run
percentage reductions were higher: 15.50, 3.65,
and 1.82, respectively. The corporate income tax
exhibited the largest tax-sensitivity parameter (in
absolute value) and the sales tax the smallest,
which is in line with the expectation that the
corporate income tax base is the most tax
sensitive, in part because interprovincial and
international tax-base shifting is possible through
the use debt financing and transfer pricing and
because, in the long run, higher corporate income
taxes discourage corporate investment, ultimately
leading to a lower corporate tax base. On the
other hand, the sales tax base is relatively tax
insensitive, although the base is eroded through
cross-border shopping and other tax-avoidance
and tax-evasion measures. The only statistically
significant cross-base effect is that of a corporate
income tax rate increase on the personal income
tax base, and this effect is positive.
We calculated the si parameters from the share
of total tax revenue – defined as the sum of
provincial income taxes, consumption taxes,
property and related taxes, and other taxes – for
the corporate income tax, personal income tax,
and provincial sales tax in each province in each
year. In all provinces (except Alberta, which has
no provincial sales tax), these three taxes represent
a significant share of total tax revenue. The tax
rates we used in the analysis are the general
provincial corporate income tax rate, the
provincial marginal tax rate levied on the top tax
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